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Faculty and Deans

The UCC and ME in Process
By Ingrid Michelsen Billinger

mercia! code with its difficult terminology,concepts, and
rephrasing of every existing legal principle. As I plodded
through the hundreds of pages of committee reports, law
reviews and testimony of this period, I found myself
invariably siding with the drafters. They were unquestionably the good guys, wearing the white hats and
championing the cause of reason and commercial good
sense. I reacted to the Code's critics with naked disbelief
and scorn-after all, how could anyone in his right mind
doubt the rationality of a uniform commercial code?
History repeated itself at the NPC conference. Scores
of people went to the floor microphone to question the
need for a uniform payments code, arguing that needed
changes and clarifications could be accomplished by
amending the existing code rather than by creating a
whole new code. Although history was repeating itself, I
was troubled because I seemed to be on the wrong side.
I, too, was wondering why we needed the NPC and
whether my allegiance had switched to the dark side. Did
my opposition stem from an illegimate source, viz., six
long and hard years, devoted to figuring out Articles 3
and 4? A commentator once noted that some of Article
3's oddities2 stemmed from dutiful reverence of loyal
sons to the N.l.L. 3 It occurred to me that I might have
.become a loyal daughter of Article 4. By the end of the
conference, I was relieved to know that the NPC drafters
had persuaded me of the need for major change. The
conference taught me a valuable lesson. It is a whole lot
easier to make judgments about history than to judge
history in the making.
Although this particular draft of the NPC will never see
the light of day because the critical interest groupsbanks, consumers and academics-all had serious problems with it, something like it is definitely on the horizon.
The following synopsis provides a glimpse of the new
joys and challenges that lie in store for all of us.
At the moment, thanks to financial and technological
ingenuity, a variety of payment systems exist. Of course,
there is the old and definitely unchic way of payingcash. Also, there are the tried and true methods of check
and promissory note. In the past couple of decades,
payment by 3 party charge cards, the "plastic money" of
VISA, Master Card, etc., has become extremely popular.
More recently, electronic transfers-wire transfers-are
the vogue. In addition, there are other, less well known
payment systems. The so-called "otT-line debit card" is
conceptually identical to the check. The buyer gives the
merchant his debit card, which the merchant then uses to
prepare a slip. The buyer who signs the slip thereby
directs his bank (the card issuer) to pay the merchant.
The merchant forwards the slip through the bank collection process. When the slip arrives at the bank which
issued the debit card, the bank pays the merchant in
accordance with the buyer's instructions. This kind of
payment is not accomplished by electronic means. An
"on-line" debit card does effect payment by electronic
transmission. It is referred to as a "point-of-sale" (POS)
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This past fall, I was invited to attend a three-day
conference on the Uniform New Payments Code ("the
NPC") 1, sponsored by the American Law Institute, the
American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Legal Education and the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code. My reaction to the invitation
was something akin to what I suppose would happen if
Paul Newman asked me out for lunch. Only my love for
family, Marshall-Wythe and country surpasses my love
of and interest in the UCC and anything connected with
it. Having devoted the better part (read that "waking
moments") of an entire summer to a UCC problem which
required extensive research into the UCC's tumultuous
legislative history, the prospect of actually witnessing the
UCC "in process" both excited and intrigued me. During
the time that the UCC drafters debated and defended
their Code (from about 1949 until 1962), doubting Thomases repeatedly questioned the need for a single uniform code covering all facets of a commercial transaction. Many took an "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"
attitude. They argued that the existing law was certain
and a massive overhaul would precipitate endless litigation. These individuals believed that ambiguities and
trouble spots in the existing law could be and should be
remedied by limited, focused changes. The law did not
need and these critics did not welcome a uniform com8

transaction. The merchant has a computer terminal in his
store and uses the buyer's debit card to debit the buyer's
bank account and credit the merchant's account before
the buyer leaves the store with his merchandise.

sistencies. At bottom. the drafters intended the NPC to
do for disparate payment systems what Article 9 did for
disparate security devices. 7
A unitary approach to all payment systems required an
approach which would. of necessity, cover both paper
and non-paper based transactions. This. in turn. necessitated a whole new terminology and the NPC creates it
with a vengeance. much to the bewilderment and audible
groans of the audience. (l re-experienced the despair I
had felt as a student taking Commercial Law 1.) To begin
with. we do not have "banks" under the NPC. we have
"account institutions." We have "account institutions"
rather than "banks," because the word "bank" does not
encompass credit unions, mutual funds, savings and loan
institutions, Mastercharge, ATMs. and other forms of life
which are implicated in today's payment systems. Section 53(1) of the NPC defines an "account institution" as
"any person which in the ordinary course of its business
maintains accounts for its customers ... That seems simple enough until you get to the definition of "account,"
which § 50( I) defines as "a liability in money" (that
covers banks, credit unions, etc.), "credit extended"
(that covers finance companies such as VISA or Mastercharge) or "interest in assets on which orders may be
drawn or to which orders may be credited" (that covers
mutual funds).
Because the NPC only applies to "orders," its definition of "order" is critical. Section 10(1) defines "order"
as "a complete and unconditional direction by a person
to pay (a) a sum certain in money; (b) from an account
which may be accessed to pay a person other than the
drawer or the drawee; (c) to take place immediately or at
a definite time; (d) to or for the benefit of a specific payee.
which may be the drawer or bearer and (f) identifying the
drawer and if it is a written draw order, signed by the
drawer." Although the NPC's "order" bears some resemblance to Article 3's definition of a negotiable instrument, there are several differences. First of all, the NPC
obviously does not require a writing. As a result, it only
requires a signature if there is a writing. Secondly, under
Article 3, "bearer" can never be a specific payee but
under the NPC, "he" can. Thirdly, the NPC adds a new
thought by requiring an account which can be accessed to
pay someone other than the drawer or drawee. The
drafters deliberately excluded two-party charge cards
from NPC coverage. Finally and most significantly, the
NPC eliminates those dear little "magic words" of negotiability. What does that mean in terms of the fundamental concepts of negotiability, holder in due course rights
and the ability to cut off claims and defenses? The NPC
has a complicated answer to that. Claims and defenses
are not cut off as against a consumer drawer or with
respect to any order which states that it is not entitled to
"due course" rights.
While some of us just mourned the passing of a venerable tradition, the banking spokesmen were furious. "Just
exactly how did the drafters propose to distinguish a
consumer order from a non-consumer order?" The banking interests viewed the situation as yet another instance
of the law "dumping" on the banks. Professor Hal Scott,
Chief Reporter for the NPC, responded that the banks
obviously would have to figure out some way to identify
consumer accounts and hence consumer orders, but in
light of technology and banking ingenuity, he felt that
surely the problem was not insurmountable. He sug-

There is also the "ACH" method of payment (automated clearing house) whereby parties can prearrange
automatic payment. An ACH credit is prearranged by the
payor-e.g., an employer can pay his payroll by directing
his bank to credit periodically his employees' accounts.
An ACH debit is an automatic, prearranged debit by the
payee. For instance, by prearrangment of the parties, a
utility company, as payee, can initiate a debit against a
customer's account on a periodic basis. In addition,
payment can occur through an automated teller machine
(ATM) which is a computerized banking terminal. In
1982, ATMs handled more than 2 billion transactions and
involved in excess of $240 billion dollars. 4 The sheer
volume of checks that must be processed today has
produced another development, viz. check truncation.
Rather than moving checks through the country, the first
bank in the collection process retains all checks it receives. Thereafter the check collection process and payment are accomplished by electronic transmissions between all the banks. The number and kinds of payment
systems are mind-boggling and no end is in sight.
Presently, Article 3 governs promissory notes, Article
4 governs checks, the federal Electronic Funds Transfer
Act (EFTA) governs electronic transfers and the federal
Truth-in Lending Act (TILA) addresses 3 party credit
cards. No statutory law exists with respect to ACHs,
ATMs or "on line" debit cards. No one is sure whether
Article 4 governs "off-line" debit cards. Article 4 applies
to "items," which§ 4-104(g) defines as "any instrument
for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable." Article 4's application to truncated checks is also
problematic, where is me item?
The different bodies of law governing the different
payment systems not surprisingly provide different rules.
Not only does this affect 4ser choice, it also creates an
impossible situation if the payment system in question is
an amalgam of two or more payment methods. One
conference speaker said that he had recently received a
package of checks called "Master check." The letter
accompanying the checks described them as "companion
check loans" to be treated like a cash advance-"no one
will know you are using credit." He had a charge card but
no checking account with the bank that had sent the
checks. How would one characterize that situation to
determine the applicable law?
The proliferation of payment systems and discrete
bodies of law or no law at all led the NPC drafters to
conclude that a single unified law concerning payments
should be implemented. A unitary approach would avoid
the legal quagmires and inconsistent approaches which
have resulted and will continue to occur under our
present state of affairs. The drafters believed that the
"new legal framework should not distort user choices
among different systems." 5 To this end, the drafters
imposed the same legal consequences on all kinds of
transactions wherever technology and the nature of the
transaction permitted similar treatment. 6 The NPC proposes to replace Article 4, the EFTA and TILA. It also
seeks to establish statutory rules for all those payment
systems for which no statutory Jaw presently exists and
the common Jaw is characterized by confusion and incon-
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gested a specially colored check or a special computer
symbol.
The consumer interests vehemently objected to the
consumer/non-consumer order distinction on other
grounds. Section 50(12) defines "consumer account" as
an account "in the name of one or more individuals
unless such individuals have represented in writing to the
account institution that the account is not to be used
primarily for personal, family or household purposes."
Although § 800(4) imposes civil liability on an account
institution which advises an individual to misrepresent
his intentions with respect to the account's use, the
consumer interests maintained that lower charges could
persuade individuals to waive their consumer account
protection. Rational consumers might opt for lower
charges and presumably nonconsumer accounts would
involve lower charges because banking risks were less.
The debate was followed by a huge (and heated) discussion about the advisability of allowing non-consumer
drawers to eliminate due course rights by stating so on
their instruments. This attack clearly surprised and bemused the drafters. Somewhat incredulously, they responded that Article 3 presently permits that. For instance, an individual can eliminate any possibility of a
subsequent holder in due course by simply scratching out
the words "to the order of' on his check. Even though
the drafters were absolutely correct-they were not
really changing anything at all-they failed to persuade
the audience of that fact. The audience perceived this
change as fundamentally threatening our orderly commercial society. (I found this concern to be uncommonly
silly. Who would take either a check with the words "to
the order of' scratched out or a NPC order indicating
that due course rights were not available?)
The NPC distinguishes between "draw orders" and
"pay orders." Adraw order is "an order initiated by the
drawer and transmitted to the payee ... " A check, for
instance, is an example of a draw order. A "pay order" is
"an order initiated by the drawer to the drawee directing
the drawee to pay ... the payee ... " The speaker on this
topic said that a draw order pulls funds back from the
payor account institution to the account institution of
first deposit for the benefit of the depositor, while a pay
order pushes funds from the payor account institution to
the account institution holding the payee's account. This
push/pull metaphor obviously enamoured all the drafters.
My initial response was "huh?" If you read it twenty
times, you realize that the difference between a draw
order and a pay order is to whom you give the order:
draw orders go first to the payee, pay orders go directly
from the drawer to the drawee.
Because the NPC applies to non-paper based payment
systems, the term "holder" became useless-holder of
what? Therefore, the NPC had to create a new person.
He is the "funds claimant." Because you cannot indorse
non-writings, indorsers and indorsees had to go too. The
NPC substitutes in their stead "transferors" and "transferees." That seems manageable until you get to pay
orders when you have "funds transferors" and "funds
transferees." The "funds transferor" is the person directed to pay. The "funds transferee" is the person who
is to receive payment. Even that is tolerable. It is only
when you realize that there can be "funds claimant
transferors" and "funds claimant transferees" that one
begins to despair. Bowing to technological advances, the

NPC's new cast of characters also includes a new villain,
the "interloper." He is the fellow who intercepts an
electronic transmission and changes either the amount of
the order or to whom it is payable or both. (By the time
he was introduced, we were all tired and I was punchy.
"Home, home on the range where the deer and the
interloper play" kept going through my mind.)
All of this new terminology and pushing and pulling did
not sit well with the audience. In addition to general
confusion, noises began to be made that maybe electronic transfer payment methods were different from
checks which were different from credit cards and the
differences really justified different treatments. At about
this time, it also came out that Article 3 would continue
to govern promissory notes and Article 4 might have to
remain to govern promissory notes collected through
banking channels. The NPC then would not replace
Articles 3 and 4. It would be in addition to Article 3 and
4! (I must admit to a fleeting sense of pleasure that if the
NPC were adopted, our Commercial Law I course would
have to be 8 credit hours.)
By the end of the three days, it was clear that no one
much liked the NPC. Consumer interests believed that
the NPC gave fewer rights to consumers, the banks
believed that it gave too many rights to consumers.
Everyone thought that the language and terms were
unduly complicated. Finally, over and above everything
else, actual adoption of the NPC seemed impossible. In
light of the supremacy clause, states could not successfully enact the NPC because it overrides federal law, viz.,
TILA and EFTA. That left as the only alternative federal
enactment. No one dared to entrust the NPC to Congress. The overall consensus then, for one reason or
another or several, was negative in the extreme.
Although this draft of the NPC will surely not be
approved, and perhaps the basic dream of a uniform
payments code will never become a reality, certainly
some of its suggested clarifications of existing law will be
adopted. For those devotees of Articles 3 and 4, here is a
quick run down of issues you considered in Commercial
Law I.
I. The NPC adopts the reasoning of the West Side case
and eliminates completion of the process of posting
as a benchmark for final payment. § 420.
2. A cow no longer qualifies as a negotiable instrument, nor do bricks, tissue paper or cocktail napkins. According to comment I to § 101, a payor
account institution is only required "to pay authorized orders initiated by an access device provided
to the drawer by the account institution." Banks
customarily do not issue the above as means to
draw on accounts.
3. Much to the objection of those in attendance, the
NPC sounds the death knell to Price v. Neal. The
drafters justified overturning this ancient doctrine
by noting that with check truncation, the payor
account institution cannot verify the drawer's signature. Even with non-truncated checks, banks do not
verify signatures because it is uneconomical to do
so. Section 204(1) sacrifices the finality afforded by
Price v. Neal in favor of imposing the loss on the
party who dealt with the thief.
4. The sum certain requirement is satisfied even if the
order contains a variable interest rate, if that interest rate is based on a widely and publicly quoted
10

interest rate, such as the federal funds rate or prime
rate of a particular account institution.
5. The NPC gives the intended beneficiary of a check a
direct cause of action in conversion against the
depository account institution, thereby codifying
the present, albeit tortured, judicial "interpretation" of§ 3-419(3) (§ 205(1).)
6. Section 50(3) defines "good faith" as the "absence
of bad faith. Bad faith is dishonesty in fact, malice
in the conduct or transaction concerned, or willful
or reckless disregard of known material facts." (The
banking representatives really kicked and hollered
about this change. We were treated to impassioned
pleas to shield banks from courts who might construe bank stupidity as bad faith. Banks maintained
that the Code should protect their stupidity.)
I want to end my observations as I began them,-on a
personal note. Professor Scott, a short man with wiry
hair, typically sat at the front table facing the audience.
He smoked. By the third day, he had taken to twirling his
hair and chain-smoking. The situation must have been
discouraging. On the first day, the chairman of the conference had said that, absent consensus from the assembled group, the NPC would never get anywhere. By the
end of the conference, everyone knew what that consensus was and what it meant. As I watched the dream of a
uniform payments code unravel and Professor Scott twirl
his hair more and more rapidly, I felt very sorry for him
and all the drafters who had worked for 6 years on the
project. It was not until the last day, the last hour almost,
that someone stood before the microphone and thanked
the committee for their fine and hard work and noted that
it had not gone unappreciated. At the time, I thought
back to Karl Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore and wondered
how they had managed to weather 20 years of hostile
critics, powerful lobbying groups, sheer stupidity, infighting and every other unpleasantry that must be endured to
make a vision become a reality. Emerging from the
conference, I thought about the many unsung heroes
whose blood, sweat and tears had changed our law for
the better and paid my respects.

the traditional requirements for theft may not be present.
For one thing, an electronic command may not constitute
a taking. For another, the contents of a computer memory bank may not be property. In addition, criminal fraud
requires misrepresentation to a person and legally, a
computer may not be a person. According to the report,
the absence of law, in conjunction with the proliferation
of electronic based systems and the concommittant opportunity for crime, has created a critical situation. The
absence of civil law produces an equally critical situation
as courts attempt to allocate loss between innocent victims of these crimes. The NPC provides a set of rules
allocating risks and can guide courts and also inform the
parties at risk so that they can take steps to protect
against loss (for instance, insurance) or allocate the loss
differently by contract.

Post-Script: On February 20, 1984, the Daily Press carried an AP story headlined "Laws lacking on electronic
crime actions." The article discussed a Justice Department report expressing great concern about the inadequacy of existing crimina/laws with respect to electronic
fund transfer and computer crime. Although electronic
crimes have the same consequences as traditional theft,

FOOTNOTES
6. Under the present situation, parties have different rights depending
upon the payment system used. For instance, if a consumer pays a
merchant by check, the consumer has no recourse against his bank
once final payment occurs. If a consumer pays by a bank charge
card, § 170 of TILA gives him certain rights.
7. In fact, on the last day of the conference. a young. bright and
somewhat brash academic noted the similarities of purpose between
the NPC and Article 9 and then criticized the N PC for tracking itself
along the lines of Article 4 rather than Article 9. In his opinion,
Article 4 was the Code's most poorly drafted article and therefore a
terrible model. Fairfax Leary ("Fax"), one ofthe Article 4 drafters,
a general Code gadfly and conference participant, sat close by. The
audience's response of "oooh" suggested that it did not want Fax's
name to be taken in vain.

1. The origins of the acronym ''NPC'' are almost as complicated as the
NPC itself. The Uniform Probate Code got to "UPC" first. That
scotched the name "Uniform Payments Code." The drafters added
the word "new" to give the letter "N" which was not the letter "U"
and therefore permitted an available three letter acronym.
2. The Article 3 definition of "value" which differs from the Article I
definition of "value" is a good example of such an oddity.
3. "N.l.L." stands for Negotiable Instruments Law, the law which
preceded Article 3 and which every state had enacted as of I924.
4. The Daily Press, Monday, February 20, 1984.
5. Memorandum to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws from Hal S. Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Committee, dated June 15, 1983, p. I.
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